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Abstract. The Denial of Service Testing Framework (dosTF) being developed 
as  part  of  the  joint  India-Australia  research  project  for  ‘Protecting  Critical 
Infrastructure  from  Denial  of  Service  Attacks’  allows  for  the  construction, 
monitoring and management of emulated Distributed Denial of Service attacks 
using modest hardware resources. The purpose of the testbed is to study the 
effectiveness  of  different  DDoS  mitigation  strategies  and  to  allow  for  the 
testing of defense appliances.  Experiments are saved and edited in XML as 
abstract descriptions of an attack/defense strategy that is only mapped to real 
resources at run-time. It also provides a web-application portal interface that 
can start, stop and monitor an attack remotely. Rather than monitoring a service 
under  attack indirectly,  by  observing traffic  and general  system parameters, 
monitoring of the target  application is performed directly in  real time via a 
customised SNMP agent.
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1. Introduction
The paper discusses the design of the Distributed Denial  of Service testbed being 
developed  as  part  of  a  joint  India-Australia  research  project  entitled  ‘Protecting 
Critical  Infrastructure  from  Denial  of  Service  Attacks:  Tools,  Technology  and 
Policy’. 
This paper is divided into four parts. Part 1 provides a brief background to the 
problem and the role it  plays within the research project. Part 2 critically assesses 
existing testbeds for studying DDoS attacks. Part 3 describes the our current testbed, 
Part  4  describes  some experiments  already carried out using it,  and in  Part  5 we 
describe future directions for the testbed.
Distributed  Denial  of  Service  (DDoS)  is  a  serious  and  growing  problem  for 
corporate and government services doing business on the Internet. Some botnets now 
number in millions of compromised machines [1], [2]. As well as for other nefarious 
purposes, these botnets can be used to launch Distributed Denial of Service attacks, 
such as  those  recently  carried  out  against  Twitter,  Facebook [3],  and government 
websites in the US and South Korea [4]. Modern DDoS attacks can muster 49GBps of 
attack traffic, but more recently this type of flooding attack is giving way to more 
sophisticated, stealthy attacks designed to cripple a particular service [5]. The India-
Australia project aims to address various aspects of this problem, and is divided into 
five sub-projects:
1. Probabilistic Packet Processing to Mitigate High-rate Flooding Attacks
2. DoS Defence Appliance for Web Services
3. Puzzles for DoS Mitigation in Protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange
4. Denial of Service Vulnerabilities and Challenges in Emerging Technologies
5.  Harmonisation  of  Policy,  Legal  and  Regulatory  Environments  for  National 
Information Infrastructure Protection
Of these, the first four subprojects all require the use of a  testbed facility. A DDoS 
testbed  is  an  essential  tool  for  preparing  and  testing  the  defensive  strategies, 
appliances and protocols against such  attacks as we are intending to research.
2. Existing Testbeds
Based on existing implementations, a DDoS testbed needs to provide facilities to:
1. Specify, save and replay an experiment
2. Deploy, run and stop an experiment
3. Monitor the simulated DDoS attack in progress and to save the results to 
disk for later replay or analysis.
There have been three basic strategies used for building a DDoS testbed:
1.  Simulation.  In  this  technique  a  network  simulator  such  as  ns-2  [6],  [7]  or 
OPNET [8] is used to specify and then instantiate a simulation on a single computer. 
The accuracy of such simulations and their suitability for DDoS experimentation has, 
however, recently been called into question [9], [10]. The attraction of simulation is 
that virtually any network topology can be created quickly and inexpensively; the 
prime disadvantage is that simulated networks when under attack may behave very 
differently from real or emulated networks [9].
2. Emulation. In this technique real machines are connected together to form the 
topology of  the  test  network.  Although the  end-points  of  the  network are  mostly 
physical computers, the connections between networks are normally provided by soft-
routers. Although more realistic than simulation, emulation suffers from scalability: it 
is hard to extend a local Ethernet network of PCs to model the performance of entire 
ISP networks that use powerful hardware routers, ATM, and multi-gigabit links.
3.  The use of real  networks cannot be discounted, but would seem to pose too 
many problems: (a) it is not possible to change the network to suit the experiment, (b) 
certain experiments, e.g. those involving Internet worms, could escape from the test 
and infect or damage the wider Internet,  and (c) collateral degradation of network 
links may result from flooding attacks. Certain types of DDoS attacks, such as low-
level stealth attacks, however, could conceivably be tested on a real section of the 
Internet like PlanetLab, a world-wide network of virtual machines [11].  
2.1 The DETER Testbed
The DETER testbed [12], [13] is closest to the kind of design we are seeking, for a 
small to moderate size facility that allows experiments to be safely contained, and 
uses reconfigurable hardware and software. However, there are a number of reasons 
why we chose to deviate from the DETER design:
1. DETER uses the Emulab software. This has a GPL license, which only permits 
modifications under the same license. Since the terms of the India-Australia project 
specify that any software produced shall be licensed to the respective governments, 
not the general public, this is less useful to us.
2.  The Emulab and DETER testbeds [6],  [12]  use a  relatively large number of 
physical machines. We needed to build something with more modest resources.
3. The Emulab software design would be too complex to mimic, since it probably 
would cost more than the hardware it would run on [12]. For example, the ability to 
share and partition the testbed is not needed.
4. Our experiments comparing soft routers with hardware routers have shown that 
soft routers, even properly tuned, perform poorly in comparison to hardware routers 
with  small-packet  traffic,  apparently  because  the  host  computer  cannot  process 
interrupts from the ethernet card fast enough to avoid dropped packets [14]. Under a 
DDoS flood attack a soft-router might thus introduce a serious anomaly. 
The  DETER  testbed  uses  VLANs  and  soft-routers  (but  also  some  hardware 
routers)  to  provide  flexibility.  Experiments  recorded as  ns-scripts  (in  Tcl)  can  be 
quickly recreated by programming the VLANs and routers to generate the desired 
network  topology.  The  advantages  of  ease  of  use,  sharability,  and  remote  access 
however, must be balanced against the disadvantages of higher cost in constructing, 
administering and maintaining the testbed.
3. The dosTF Testbed
The dosTF testbed has evolved organically in response to our own research needs. It 
may thus provide a useful model and alternative approach for other research groups 
wanting to construct their own small scale testbed for DDoS experimentation. 
An example of our current experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. The same or 
additional components could be rearranged as desired for a particular experiment. A 
total of 8 average PCs, installed with a mixture of Linux and Windows, are each fitted 
with two ethernet cards. These two interfaces ensure that all physical machines are 
dual-homed.  The  monitor  network  is  on  a  single  subnet,  and  is  used  to  install 
software, launch and stop attacks and to monitor services during attacks. The attack 
network, consisting of two subnets joined by a physical router, is used to carry out 
attacks  on  particular  services,  to  generate  background  traffic,  or  to  host  defense 
applications or devices. The physical PCs are intended to act as targets, although they 
may also participate as agents. One of these also acts as a point of remote access, and 
another as a base for launching attacks. Three VMWare servers provide around 200 
virtual hosts that may be used in simulated DDoS attacks. The driver of this design 
has been cost: it seems wasteful to maintain hundreds of physical machines, when 
most  of  them will  only  send  low  levels  of  data  to  the  attack  target.  We  intend 
eventually  to  evolve  this  design  by  acquiring  more  physical  routers  to  study 
aggregation of traffic at focal points in the network topology. For now, it suffices to 
study the direct effects of flood and stealth attacks on applications from a range of IP-
addresses.
Fig. 1: Example dosTF Topology
The main difference between this design and the DETER model is shown in Fig. 2-
3. Whereas in DETER a software layer is effectively introduced by the programmable 
VLANs and soft-routers, in our design the structure of the network topology has to be 
reconfigured manually.  Our XML description of the experiment (or scenario) has no 
intervening software layer, and hence must refer directly to the physical testbed. This 
has  the disadvantage that  every change in the setup of  the testbed will  invalidate 
previously saved experiments. 
Our solution to  this deficiency is  shown in Fig 3:  The scenario only stores  an 
abstract description of the experiment: the number of attacking hosts, their operating 
systems, their preferred type (virtual or physical), the characteristics of the target and 
the software to be installed on them. When an experimenter launches an attack, the 
control  application  maps  the  abstract  description  of  the  experiment  to  physical 
machines.  This mapping is  performed by a benign worm, which infects machines 
hosting an ssh service and a particular account. Each machine then reports back to the 
control application what its system characteristics are, and a list of the machines it is 
directly connected to. In this way the topology of the network is quickly discovered. 
In this way the network topology is only stored in one place, in its physical topology. 
This  yields  the same degree of  flexibility  as in  the DETER testbed, although the 
topology has to be wired manually. 
Fig. 2: DETER Testbed Model
Fig. 3: dosTF Abstract Scenario
3.1 Monitoring
The monitoring of a machine under a DDoS attack involves an obvious and serious 
problem: how can an application respond promptly with information about its status, 
when it is already under attack? Even in severe attacks, however, the multi-tasking 
design  of  modern  operating  systems  should  allow  enough  responsiveness  in  the 
overall  system to enable  the  gathering of  basic  statistics  at  regular  intervals.  The 
saturation of the attack network can then be easily dealt with by installing a second 
Ethernet card to use as the monitoring interface. This is also a feature of the DETER 
Testbed  [12].  The  advantage  of  using  live  feedback  during  an  attack  is  that  it 
becomes possible to see the performance of service applications as they buckle under 
the strain imposed by a DDoS attack, or recover as defensive measures are engaged.
The  method  we  chose  for  live  monitoring  was  to  install  an  SNMP  (Simple 
Network Management Protocol) service on each potential target. We could then query 
the target for a wealth of built-in MIB (Management Information Base) variables such 
as, for example, tcpOutRsts (requests to resend a TCP segment). Such information 
has sometimes been used to detect the presence of a DDoS attack [15]. However, 
these system-wide  values  are less  useful  when monitoring the  effect  of  an attack 
against a single service. According to Mircovic  et al. [16] denial of service can be 
effectively measured by monitoring only a select few application-specific parameters: 
chiefly memory and CPU usage, as well as responsiveness and goodput (the amount 
of data actually being received and sent out by the application). 
Another  drawback  with  the  standard  SNMP  installation  is  that  per-second 
monitoring of network-related MIB-values tends to tie up the CPU. In our case we 
observed 30% CPU utilisation with the default Linux SNMP agent running, when 
querying IF-MIB variables. That is certainly not discreet monitoring. 
Our solution was to write a small custom MIB that would discreetly  measure the 
following parameters on a per-second basis for any named service:
1. Percentage of system memory being used
2. Percentage of CPU being used
3. Number of active threads or forked children of a process
4. Response time in milliseconds to a generic query
5. Goodput - the actual data throughput of the service
6. Does the response to a given challenge match the expected value?
This is all we currently measure, but the custom MIB can be extended at any time. 
It is written as a separate agent that can be brought up or down without disruption to 
the main SNMP agent.
Parameters 1, 2 and 3 can be measured by system commands that take only a few 
milliseconds to run. 
Response time is  measured in nanoseconds,  up to a maximum of 15 secs, of a 
named service to a given challenge string, which usually consists of binary digits. The 
values for HTTP, TELNET, FTP, SSH and DNS query generic properties of their 
respective services, e.g. the HTTP challenge merely requests the server’s options, and 
the DNS challenge requests the service’s status. But it is also possible to override the 
default challenge, to define new services, to change ports and protocols etc. 
Goodput is not currently measurable, but can be computed without modification of 
the service by modifying the kernel, at least in the case of Linux/UNIX. This may be 
preferable to ‘instrumenting’ the service, i.e. by modifying it [16]. By overriding calls 
to  send  and  recv  in  the  socket  library,  the  number  of  bytes  transferred  over  a 
particular port/protocol combination (i.e. a given service) can be computed.
The advantage of using SNMP is that existing software libraries for querying and 
setting values, as well  as command-line tools can be used. We also envisage that 
using these specific MIB values, rather than the general ones, may provide a more 
accurate way for an alarm system to detect denial of service.
3.2 The Scenario
An experimenter needs to specify what form an attack will  take, and to save that 
information  so  it  can  be  edited  and  replayed  later.  DETER uses  Tcl  largely  for 
historical reasons [9], but syntactically this is a programming language with a fixed 
syntax, and is not ideally suited to the recording of an abstract experiment. XML [17], 
on  the  other  hand,  is  a  widely  used  markup  language  suitable  for  a  variety  of 
programming tasks. Many tools for reading and writing XML files already exist, and 
changing the scenario schema or structure in response to design changes is easy. Our 
schema contains the following basic elements:
Agents: may be one of attacker, traffic generator, defender or service. These are 
programs that can be launched from the command line. Each agent is 
specified by a set of runtime parameters, the system requirements, the 
number of hosts it should be copied to, and the type of hosts required 
(e.g.  real  or  virtual,  and  desired  operating  system).  The  control 
application (described below) will then choose an appropriate binary to 
copy to the specified host.
Targets: There  may  be  more  than  one,  and  each  is  specified  simply  by  an 
operating  system  type  and  optionally  by  an  IP-address.  This  latter 
facility is needed because otherwise the default choice of target may not 
be what is desired.
Views: These describe the layout of portlet windows in the testbed software, to 
be described below. This section is entirely optional, but otherwise there 
would no way to save the screen layout of the tools used for monitoring 
a particular experiment. 
3.3 Command and Control
The experimental  scenario described above needs to be activated by some means. 
Agents will first have to be copied to their assigned targets. This is achieved in dosTF 
via  SFTP. This can be configured so that  the payload will  only be copied to the 
targeted host if the current file is more recent. 
The attack command is then issued by the control workstation via ssh,  using a 
standard username and password. Since the interface is simply the commandline, this 
allows us to leverage most existing tools. For example, the traffic generator D-ITG 
[18] can be easily configured within the scenario to generate various types of traffic.
In  the  third  phase  the  experiment  is  monitored  in  real  time  by  the  control 
workstation via SNMP. The results are displayed on the workstation as a series of 
graphs and the values are logged to local files automatically. 
Fig. 4. Pluto Portal Interface
3.4 Web Interface
DETER uses a desktop based GUI application to monitor and control experiments, 
and RPC for communications [13]. This introduces some complications, since user 
authentication has to be programmed in, and the application must be available on the 
computer  connecting  to  the  testbed.  GUI development  is  inherently  complex  and 
expensive [19]. Changes to the functionality of the underlying program can cause 
expensive alterations to the GUI. This could easily lead to the GUI taking more time 
to develop than the underlying functionality.
Our solution to this problem was to use a modular web application interface for 
GUI development, such as a portal server. The GUI is accessed via an ordinary web 
browser either remotely or locally. The web interface is divided into a number of sub-
windows, or portlets, which can be installed and arranged, or duplicated by the user to 
suit the experiment. Authentication is already built-in, as also (on some servers) user 
filespace management for saving experimental results. Fig. 4 shows the current state 
of the interface, and includes three portlets, one which edits the XML scenario file, 
another on the right that launches attacks, and a monitor portlet that graphs the chosen 
SNMP MIB variables and also logs them to disk.
4. Experimental Results
Using the dosTF testbed, we have successfully run two denial-of-service experiments 
against Web services. 
4.1 Experiment 1
The first experiment exploits a vulnerability in the Ruby XML parser. The attack uses 
an invalid Web service request payload containing a deeply-nested meaningless XML 
message (up to 100,000-levels deep), and then sends a flood of such requests to the 
Ruby server. The payload size is around 1.5 MB. A vulnerable XML parser will try to 
load each of the XML messages sent.  The goal is  to consume all  of the memory 
available on the server, causing a potential denial-of-service to legitimate clients.
The single attack and victim machines are physical hosts on the same subnet as 
shown in Fig. 1. The victim server’s resources include a dual-core 3 GHz CPU and 
3.7 GB memory. We have used the SNMP monitoring provided by the dosTF testbed 
to track memory usage and CPU usage before and during the attack. The result of the 
experiment is shown in Fig. 5.
4.2 Experiment 2
The second experiment exploits a vulnerability in many web services that respond to 
unauthenticated requests for their service description files, or WSDL documents. In 
this experiment, we tested the effect of performing repeated requests for a WSDL 
document on a Web service developed using the Java Metro library, deployed on the 
Glassfish application server. By default, the WSDL document will be dynamically 
generated,  requiring some processing by the server.  Successive requests may thus 
have a significant impact on CPU and memory consumption, and on the response 
time for legitimate web service requests.
The two attack machines were real hosts,  and the victim was a virtual  host, as 
shown in Fig. 1, but without the intervening router. The victim machine’s resources 
were  a  dual-core  2.4  GHz  CPU  and  868  MB  of  memory.  Figure  5  shows  the 
application server  response  as  tracked  via the SNMP monitoring  provided by the 
testbed.
Fig. 5: CPU and Memory Usage for Experiments 1 and 2
5. Future Developments
As well as being a general DoS testing facility, the dosTF testbed can also provide a 
flexible  framework  for  carrying  out  experiments  involving  specific  devices. 
Subproject 1, for example, aims to develop a ‘network flooding attack mitigation tool’ 
capable  of  protecting  security  devices,  such  as  an  application-aware  firewall.  As 
shown in Fig. 6, the device will monitor the state of the firewall and, once a high-rate 
flooding attack is detected, will initiate corrective action to mitigate the impact of the 
attack.
Another application of the testbed will be the testing of vulnerabilities introduced 
by the use of the IPv6 protocol in an emulated SCADA network controlling a set of 
distributed resources similar to those encountered in the monitoring and control of 
critical infrastructure such as in the electricity and water utilities. The aim is to study 
the  behaviour  of  such  SCADA  systems  when  known  IPv6  vulnerabilities  are 
exploited and to evaluate the effectiveness of potential mitigation techniques. 
Fig. 6:  DDoS Mitigation Module
6. Conclusion
The  dosTF  testbed  is  designed  to  provide  an  abstract  means  for  specifying  an 
experiment  that  can  be  run  unchanged  or  with  insignificant  changes  on  various 
physical  network  topologies.  By  dispensing  with  the  need  to  construct  a  virtual 
topology within  the physical  layout  of  a  dedicated testbed it  enables  experiments 
involving  new  network  appliances.  This  design,  being  simpler  than  the  DETER 
model, allows for the construction and management of a private DDoS test facility at 
minimal cost, with some sacrifice in ease of use.
This research is supported by the Australia-India Strategic Research Fund.
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